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Precluding conflict financing through the minerals sector has come to be seen 
as the panacea to ending conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
congo (DRc). The US Dodd-Frank-Act (2010) and European draft legislation at-
tempt to reduce the financing of armed groups in conflict zones by asking 
companies to conduct due diligence along their supply chains to avoid the 
purchase of “conflict minerals”. This Working Paper lays open the misconcep-
tions that have led to such a narrow regulatory approach towards the  
congolese conundrum and analyses the consequences of implementing this 
legislation without embedding it in a wider agenda for peace. The authors  
argue that regulation on conflict minerals can only contribute to solving con-
flicts in eastern DRc if it becomes part of a wider approach to peacebuilding, 
which takes into account the complex reality of eastern DRc’s conflicts. 
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enmeshed in legally ambiguous activities within the 
sector, collaborating with armed actors and profiting 
from the illegal exploitation of the minerals. At the 
same time, the central government in Kinshasa 
grants most of the mining concessions to industrial 
mining companies, making it nearly impossible for 
artisanal miners to legally work in the mining sector.  
contrary to the common view that the congolese 
state apparatus is absent, it is in fact very much 
present in the daily lives of congolese, as officials 
raise high levies on legal and illegal economic activi-
ties. Still, it is a case of state failure—a failure to 
provide security and basic necessities for the people 
living in the congo. Officials from army, police and 
administration commit most human rights abuses. 
All of these behaviours showcase the dysfunctional 
and predatory nature of the current state apparatus. 
Extending state authority in this context cannot be 
the solution. 
Regulatory measures have not reached 
their objectives
Empirical evidence suggests that prohibitive 
policy measures enacted in line with the regulation 
discourse have led to unintended negative con-
sequences. This highlights the necessity that policies 
aimed at conflict-free minerals are embedded in a 
wider agenda for peace.
Following the signature of the US Dodd-Frank Act 
(July 2010) and the ensuing suspension of mining 
activities by the congolese government (September 
2010–March 2011), the mining sector in the eastern 
provinces (Kivus and Maniema) collapsed, as many 
smelters stopped buying tin, tantalum and tungsten 
from eastern DRc. The following de facto embargo re-
sulted in a significant drop in prices of the minerals 
in eastern DRc. As a consequence, the (already high) 
levels of smuggling to neighbouring countries went 
up. With income from artisanal mining drying up, 
the money circulating in the local economy shrank, 
school drop-out rates in some areas rose up to 50 per 
cent, and living standards deteriorated. 
current legislation in the United States and 
Europe champions technical solutions such as 
“conflict-free” certification schemes for minerals or 
supply chain due diligence by companies to cut the 
links between armed conflict and Western consumers. 
This legislation is the expression of a wider “regula-
tion discourse” that is based on an economic reading 
of civil wars. The shortcomings of this discourse lie in 
its narrow interpretation of violent conflicts. When 
translated into policy, these shortcomings persist. 
The resulting narrow policy approach in itself is un-
able to solve the conflicts it means to address.
the “regulation discourse” falls short of 
capturing the reality of conflicts
One of the assumptions held by proponents of 
the regulation discourse is that mineral exploitation 
and trade is dominated by greedy rebels. Yet, looking 
at the case of the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
congo (DRc), the mining economy—one of the most 
important economic sectors—provides for basic live-
lihoods of civilians and armed actors (non-state 
armed groups and the military) alike. Greed for min-
eral profits may be one of the drivers for armed actors, 
but stronger drivers are limited livelihood options, 
anger about economic and political marginalisation, 
and frustration over unsuccessful disarmament, de-
mobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. 
Another common assumption is that minerals 
represent the main income stream for armed groups 
and an important reason for conflict. However, non-
state armed groups in eastern DRc rely on diverse in-
come sources, with the mineral trade just being one 
of them. Also, the root causes of conflicts in eastern 
DRc go well beyond the minerals economy: They can 
be traced back to long-standing socio-political 
struggles over land, identity and power in a dysfunc-
tional state and an instable region. 
Whereas regulatory initiatives base the defini-
tion of conflict-free minerals on the distinction 
between legal and illegal behaviour, in the congolese 
mining sector, the line between legal and illegal, 
“good” and “bad” is blurred. Government actors are 
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coinciding with the downturn in the mineral 
sector and the de facto embargo in eastern DRc, new 
armed groups proliferated in the period between 2010 
and 2013. This was partly because young men and  
women joined armed groups for lack of income. The 
decreased revenues from the mineral trade seemed to 
have had little impact on the financial power of 
armed groups, which shifted and diversified their  
income sources. Gold became more important for 
armed groups and artisanal miners. At the same time, 
criminality, including looting, rose significantly. Over-
all, the security situation deteriorated. 
With the implementation of certification initia-
tives in some areas of the Kivus and Maniema, the 
production of tin and, to a smaller extent, tungsten 
and tantalum picked up during the course of 2013. 
Here, prices increased and the population’s economic 
situation improved. However, due to continuous in-
security and dysfunctional state structures, the pro-
cess of certifying minerals remains a challenge and 
is limited to less remote areas closely watched by  
national and international stakeholders.  
 
no rebel without a cause \ N. BerNardiNg, L. guesNet, M. MüLLer-koNé
7 \ \ Working paper  2\ 2015
it is undoubtedly important to hold companies 
accountable and prevent negative effects of business 
operations in conflict areas. The observation of human 
rights due diligence and conflict-sensitive business 
practices should become a standard. To oblige compa-
nies to conduct due diligence on conflict minerals in 
their supply chains would be an important step in 
that direction (Müller-Koné & Guesnet, 2015). We  
believe, however, that in itself it will not bring an end 
to armed conflicts in eastern DRc and elsewhere. 
To illustrate the shortcomings of a narrow regu-
latory approach, this Working Paper lays open the mis-
conceptions that have led to such an approach 
towards the congolese conundrum and analyses the 
consequences resulting from regulations not embed-
ded in a wider agenda for peace. 
in the first part of this Working Paper, the authors 
confront the major assumptions underlying the “reg-
ulation discourse” with evidence from eastern DRc. 
The second part assembles empirical evidence about 
the consequences of the signature of the US Dodd-
Frank Act (July 2010) and the ensuing suspension of 
mining activities by the congolese government 
(September 2010–March 2011). it shows the con-
sequences of prohibitive measures taken without 
concern about the bigger picture.
Thus, the authors argue that, to avoid negative 
consequences of policy measures focussed on the 
minerals sector, legislation on conflict minerals 
needs to become part of a wider approach to peace-
building that takes into account the complex reality of 
eastern DRc’s conflicts. 
With the European parliament set to vote on 
“conflict minerals” legislation in May 2015, it seems 
that a solution to tackling “resource conflicts” has 
been found. This Working Paper intends to show why 
such a technical solution can only be the beginning 
and not the end of dedicated work towards ending 
violent conflicts in which resources are 
instrumentalised.
The proposed EU legislation has the potential to 
enforce responsible sourcing of tin, tantalum, tung-
sten (3T) and gold from conflict and high-risk areas.1 
The European legislative process follows section 1502 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, passed by the US government 
in July 2010, which
requires companies listed on the US stock exchange 
to provide specific assurances that any products that 
they have manufactured or contracted to manufac-
ture do not contain minerals “that directly or indi-
rectly finance or benefit armed groups“ in the DRC or 
its neighbours (Cuvelier, van Bockstael, Vlassenroot, 
& Iguma, 2014, p. 1). 
both pieces of legislation are based on the as-
sumption that it is crucial to preclude conflict financ-
ing via these minerals in order to bring about peace 
in regions affected by resource conflicts—the most 
prominent example being the eastern provinces of 
the Democratic Republic of the congo (DRc). The un-
derlying logic seems plausible: When armed actors 
are deprived of an important source of income, it 
makes fighting less attractive and thus contributes to 
an end to the conflict. This view has been promoted 
in recent public and political debates that have fo-
cussed on the special link between mineral resources 
and violent conflict.2
1 \  The proposed legislation uses the OEcD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply chains of Minerals from conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas as a basis for implementation. Whether the legisla-
tion will make this implementation mandatory or voluntary is one of 
the open questions. The other is its scope: Will it only encompass im-
porters of minerals or companies that sell finished products contain-
ing these minerals, too? For further details see bicc Policy Brief 2/2015.
2 \  See for instance, the Raise Hope for congo campaign by the enough 
project: http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/initiatives/con-
flict-minerals and the page on Global Witness’ campaign on conflict 
minerals: http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/con-
flict-minerals
Introduction
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both the proposed EU regulation and the Dodd-
Frank Act are the expression of a wider regulation 
discourse that has come forward in consequence of 
two emerging trends of the late 1990s: First, the in-
creasing prominence of the link between local econo-
mies of violence and international markets, through 
which rebel and government groups have financed 
their war activities. The international community at-
tempted to break this link, for instance in Sierra Leone 
and Angola, first with broad and later with “smart” 
sanctions. Second, the shift towards the responsibility 
of the private sector (Haufler, 2009, p. 407). in contrast 
to the previously dominant discourse on irresolvable 
wars resulting from intractable tribal and ethnic 
rivalries (Kaplan, 1993), economic agendas behind 
civil wars were given importance (Keen, 2000). This 
shift—away from explaining civil wars as an expres-
sion of irrational violence and breakdown of any order—
offered room for new solutions. The seemingly 
straightforward answer of ending brutal conflicts by 
cutting the financial sources of greedy warring parties 
seemed very attractive, not only to policymakers, but 
also to non- governmental organisations and human 
rights activists. Nevertheless, the new economic 
reading also has its shortcomings. it predominantly 
asks for technical solutions to address the economic 
side of conflicts. in the following, we discuss the ma-
jor assumptions underlying the regulation discourse 
in the light of evidence from the DRc.
 
Minerals finance conflicts ...  
and livelihoods
The regulation discourse is based on the idea that 
mineral exploitation and trade are dominated by 
greedy rebels.3 
in the DRc, armed groups remain involved in the 
exploitation and trade of minerals—most importantly 
gold (iPiS, 2014, pp. 8–10). Yet, these activities repre-
sent but one of their income sources. Laudati (2013) 
states that in most cases, it is not even the most 
3 \  in early publications on greed and grievances collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
cite greed as the major reason for conflict. in later works, they mainly 
argue that the exploitation of natural resources provides opportuni-
ties for armed conflict, without conflict actors being necessarily 
driven by greed (collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2006).
important one.4 The recent example of the rebel 
movement M23 (for armed groups, see Table 1), which 
occupied parts of northern Kivu from April 2012 to 
November 2013, illustrates how militarily active rebel 
groups do not necessarily engage in the minerals 
trade. As a matter of fact, M23 was not involved in the 
mineral sector, but relied mainly on household and 
transport taxes (UN Group of Experts, 2014, pp. 12–13). 
Laudati (2013) also found that M23’s predecessor, the 
National congress for the Defence of the People (cNDP) 
derived only about 15 per cent of its budget from min-
ing activities (p. 33). Even the Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) who rely compara-
tively heavily on revenues from gold have additional 
income sources, such as illegal taxation of other goods, 
agriculture and charcoal production (UN Group of Ex-
perts, 2014, p. 24; Seay, 2012, p. 18). Other armed actors 
also generate income through the trade in palm oil, 
charcoal, hemp, timber and bush meat (Doevenspeck, 
Guesnet, & Müller, 2013, p. 285). These clearly diverse 
income sources indicate that armed actors exploit 
whatever they regard as profitable and do not rely 
solely on the mineral sector (Johnson, 2009, cited in 
Laudati, 2013, p. 33).
it seems most important to acknowledge that 
“the majority of those involved in the trade in precious 
minerals continue to be motivated by coping and sur-
vival” (Larmer, Laudati, & clark, 2013, p. 6). in the con-
text of little alternative livelihoods mining is indeed 
the most important coping mechanism and survival 
strategy for 710,000 to two million eastern congolese 
(Parker & Vadheim, 2013, p. 6; Seay, 2012, p. 7). With a 
functioning state absent, the population uses this in-
come to directly finance basic needs, such as health 
care, nutrition or education. To some extent, this is 
also true for rebels and large parts of the congolese 
army, particularly the lower ranks. congolese soldiers’ 
salaries are low (approximately US $40–50/month) and 
are rarely paid. The additional income they gain from 
extorting money from mineral traders goes to buy 
basic necessities for them and their families (Seay, 
2012, p. 18). 
4 \  This is a change from the situation in both congo Wars (1996–1997, 
1998–2003), where the war economy “created a context in which it was 
economically lucrative and politically rational for the parties to con-
tinue the war despite the fact that a military solution was unlikely 
from an early stage of the conflict” (Aust & Jaspers, 2006, p. 12).
Misconceptions of the regulation discourse
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Fighting for minerals ... and more
Linked to the idea of greedy rebels is the notion 
that insecurity in eastern DRc mainly results from 
competition over mining sites and trade routes (e.g. 
Global Witness5). While fighting over mining areas 
was an important feature of the congo Wars and still 
occurs in North and South Kivu (iPiS, 2014, pp. 8–10), 
not all fights are motivated by profits to be made in 
the mining economy. Many armed clashes in eastern 
DRc today are not related to mining. congolese 
5 \  Refer to http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-
minerals
armed group Description
cNDP
National congress 
for the Defence of 
the People
This rebel group was active between 
2006 and 2009 under the leadership auf 
Laurent Nkunda. its proclaimed objec-
tive was the protection of Tutsi in the 
DRc. As part of the peace agreement of 
23 March 2009, the group was recognised 
as a political party, and its armed branch 
was integrated into the congolese army. 
cNDP originated from the RcD-Goma 
(congolese Rally for Democracy) group 
that took part in the Second congo War. 
FDLR
Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation  
of Rwanda
The FDLR rebel group was created in 2001 
and mainly consisted of Rwandan Hutu, 
some of whom were strongly implicated 
in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. For a 
long time, the FDLR was the strongest 
armed group in eastern DRc.  A sequence 
of military operations launched against 
the group since 2009 has substantially 
weakened it. Since 2002, demobilisation 
programmes are also in place. its cur-
rent strength is estimated at less than 
1,500 combatants.
M23
March 23 Movement
 
This rebel movement was founded by 
former cNDP-combatants who deserted 
the congolese Army in April 2012. it re-
ceived political and military backing 
from Rwanda and Uganda. After its mili-
tary defeat it announced an end to its 
insurgency in November 2013. 
armed groups are also driven by anger over economic 
and political marginalisation, frustration over unsuc-
cessful disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegra-
tion (DDR) programmes6  and ideologies (Stearns,  
Verweijen, & baaz, 2013, pp. 30–38; Seay, 2012, p. 19;  
Vogel, personal communication, 2014). The M23 Move-
ment illustrates this point: Due to frustration with 
the conditions of their integration into the national 
army, former cNDP rebels mutinied and formed the 
M23 Movement in March 2012, conquering Goma in 
November that same year. While their motivation 
seemed to have changed over time, they clearly had 
the political ambition to challenge the national gov-
ernment in Kinshasa in 2012 (iPiS, 2012, p. 18). Even 
the FDLR does not focus merely on conquering min-
ing areas. its presence in the border area Rutshuru 
(North Kivu), which is depleted of mining resources, 
is a clear indicator that not only other motives, but 
also other income sources influence their strategies 
(iPiS, 2014, p. 15).
underlying root causes of conflicts
One can actually trace back armed conflicts and 
the insecurity the population faces in eastern DRc to 
longstanding socio-political struggles over land, iden-
tity and power in a dysfunctional state and an un-
stable region. This goes well beyond the rather 
simplistic explanation of conflicts by a combination 
of wealth in natural resources and greedy rebels.7 
While it is beyond the scope of this Paper to offer an 
exhaustive account of reasons for violent conflicts in 
the eastern provinces, some root causes will be 
sketched here with regard to North and South Kivu.
At the heart of the formation of many armed 
groups is the feeling that the dysfunctional congolese 
state does not protect the political, economic and se-
curity interests of social groups. One example of this 
is the involvement of Tutsi businessmen and military 
commanders in the foundation of the cNDP and the 
6 \  For more information on this topic see for instance: international 
Alert, 2012. Ending the deadlock: Towards a new vision of peace in  
eastern DRc. 
7 \ According to Global Witness “fighting [in the DRc] has continued for 
almost fifteen years, driven by the trade in valuable minerals.” See: 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals
table 1
Mentioned armed groups
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violence in North Kivu, killing 10,000 and displacing 
250,000 people in 1993 (Garret, Sergiou, & Vlassenroot, 
2009, p. 7).
The whole region was destabilised, when—after 
200,000 burundians had already fled into the DRc in 
1993—one million Rwandan Hutu refugees crossed 
into the DRc, as a result of the genocide and civil war 
in Rwanda in 1994 (Reyntjens, 2009, p. 2). Among 
them were perpetrators and organisers of the geno-
cide. When new rebel groups were formed in refugee 
camps and threatened to attack Rwanda, the new 
leadership in Rwanda decided to intervene. Not only 
did Rwanda commit mass atrocities when clearing 
the refugee camps, this also was the starting point of 
the two congo Wars (1996–98; 1998–2003). These were 
fought on congolese territory but involved the troops 
of seven African countries and numerous rebel 
groups allied to different neighbouring countries. 
Ever since, and even after the Peace Agreement of 
2002, rebel and militia groups have been present in the 
east and continue to proliferate (Doevenspeck et al., 
2013, pp. 280–81).
 
the problematic role  
of the government itself 
The solution to ending violence in the congo as 
heeded in the regulation discourse is that of state 
building—to reconstruct state authority and to stop 
the illegal exploitation of minerals (Autesserre, 2012; 
international Alert, 2012, pp. 33–41). in spite of numer-
ous attempts at (and difficulties with) disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration as well as security 
sector reform, the holding of national elections in 
2006 and 2011 and the presence of the largest UN 
peacekeeping mission worldwide, the government9 
has so far not been able (or willing) to provide secur-
ity, rule of law and basic services in its eastern 
provinces. This is not to say the government is absent. 
it is indeed very much present in the daily lives of 
the congolese—but in a corrupted and dysfunctional 
manner, benefitting the elite’s interests only. in 
9 \  The term government is used in its wider definition here, encompas-
sing all branches and levels of the state apparatus, and refers to suc-
cessive governments, not just the currently ruling government. 
M23 Movement (Stearns, 2013, p. 9). While it is only re-
cently that these conflicts have become militarised, 
their roots reach back to post-colonial, colonial and 
even pre-colonial times.
The special position of the Kivu provinces to-
wards the central state and towards neighbouring 
Rwanda as well as land politics over the last century 
play a crucial role in the unfolding of violent conflicts 
in eastern congo. The most prominent of these con-
flicts involves Rwandophone populations (locally 
known as banyarwanda), encompassing Hutu and/or 
Tutsi communities (depending on the local context). 
The banyarwanda are labelled non-congolese by con-
golese groups that define themselves as autochthones. 
Some Hutu and Tutsi lived in the Kivus before colonial 
times. When colonial plantations attracted labour 
from neighbouring Rwanda, their presence increased 
significantly. The belgian colonial administration re-
settled 85,000 Hutu and Tutsi from Rwanda to the 
Kivus. After Rwandan independence, many Tutsi 
came to congo to escape state repression (Huggins, 
2010). The land rights and citizen rights of the ban-
yarwanda have been and still are contentious. They 
were given citizenship in 1972 when the ruling class 
welcomed their presence. When their status and in-
fluence was questioned during the 1980s and 1990s, 
their citizenship and other rights were also chal-
lenged. The contested issue of access to land is related 
to these identity politics. As a sound land policy is 
lacking in the DRc, the manifold shortcomings of 
land governance8 have led and continue to lead to nu-
merous disputes between individuals, which in some 
areas come to overlap with identities, pitching com-
munities against each other (Vlassenroot, 2013). Dur-
ing the democratisation process of the early 1990s, 
these struggles over land and identity led to militia 
8 \  According to Vlassenroot (2013) there are “a number of critical land-re-
lated factors contributing to violence and conflict, including many 
different types of land governance mechanisms; the existence of over-
lapping legal frameworks and the weakness of the statutory land law; 
competition between indigenous and migrant communities; limited 
access to arable land in demographically dense areas; the weak perfor-
mance of the administration and justice system in the reconciliation 
and arbitration of land disputes; growing stress on local resources cau-
sed by massive displacement; the expansion of artisanal and small- 
scale mining; and increased competition between elites for the con-
trol over land and consequent land concentration” (p. 1).
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addition to this, it is officials from army, police and 
administration who commit most of the human 
rights abuses (Autesserre, 2012, p. 219).
The mining sector is a good illustration of the 
government’s behaviour. it is the government that 
makes it nearly impossible for artisanal miners to 
legally engage in mining activities. Hardly any arti-
sanal mining zones are established, contrary to what 
is demanded by the Mining code (cabinet du Prési-
dent de la République, 2002); instead, the government 
grants most concessions to industrial mining compa-
nies. Yet officials participate in the large parallel min-
ing economy, which relies on artisanal mining. Dis-
regarding legal requirements, these officials register 
and tax artisanal miners and other economic actors 
wherever the security situation allows it (iPiS, 2014, 
p. 17; interviews by Marie Müller-Koné in South Kivu, 
2011). Some high-level officials protect smuggling 
networks (UN Group of Experts, 2014, p. 37), and army 
elements continue to directly control and tax mining 
sites (iPiS, 2014, p. 9).
Mineral exploitation and trade in eastern DRc is 
thus not only characterised by the involvement of 
non-state armed groups, but also by that of military 
and government officials as well as local authorities. 
Altogether they make up one “well-established system 
of cooperation, competition, coordination” (charbon-
nier & Atanasijevic, 2014b)—with all elements  
gaining from these activities. instead of dismissing 
artisanal mining as “informal” or “illegal”, its activi-
ties need to be seen as an adaptation to the  
socio-economic structures within a predatory state 
(Laudati, 2013, p. 44; EurAc, 2014, p. 9). in other words, 
they are a mode of governing which follows the prin-
ciples of “débrouillardise” (see box 1 and 2). 
The described circumstances, in sum, put into 
question the clear-cut distinction between illegal and 
legal behaviour and the notion that any business in 
conflict zones has mainly negative effects (ballantine 
& Nitzschke, 2003, p. 37). it also challenges the notion 
of bad rebels getting “in the way of all the good 
people” (Reyntjens, 2009, p. 216). 
Box 1  
Local modes of governing and certification
Regulatoy pluralism and “débrouillardise”
Since the Congo Wars, political authority in eastern DRC has been 
fragmented and under negotiation (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, & 
Vlassenroot, 2008, p. 14). Government institutions and other compet-
ing power holders such as customary authorities or armed groups 
strive for political control and domination and attempt to regulate 
mineral extraction. This political context can be termed “regulatory 
pluralism” (Roitman, 2005). In practice, these different power holders 
compete and collaborate at the same time; supposedly “informal” arti-
sanal mining sites are co-governed by customary authorities, armed 
groups or military units and civil government institutions (Müller-
Koné, forthcoming). 
We propose to understand these different attempts to regulate the 
mineral sector as modes of governing (see Bulkeley, Watson, & Hudson, 
2007) that bring together different power holders (state and non-state) 
in shifting coalitions. 
The predominant modes of governing in eastern Congo constitute the 
practices of débrouillardise (Müller-Koné, forthcoming). The French 
term débrouillardise [se débrouiller = to manage, cope, get by] is 
often associated with informal economy and marginalised individuals.
The term is used by Congolese people to denote a common survival tac-
tic (Marriage, 2013, pp. 2–3). Débrouillardise implies complicity and 
overlap between state and non-state power holders. The exact mode of 
governing, including the set-up of actors who exert control, is very flex-
ible and differs from one mining site to the other. Most of artisanal 
mining sites in the Kivus are governed by this principle of 
débrouillardise.
This mode of governing competes with other modes that govern min-
eral extraction, namely “statutory” large-scale mining ventures and 
transnational efforts aimed at “conflict-free” minerals. 
Confict-free certification
The formal requirement of the conflict-free certification to be legal is 
incompatible with the regulatory pluralism of the débrouillardise. 
The requirement of legality currently excludes most of artisanal min-
ing sites in the Kivus, which are located in industrial concession areas. 
Hence, conflict-free certification can only be achieved via ad hoc 
agreements on the legal status of mining sites among state authori-
ties, economic actors, and international monitors. This means that, in 
the DRC’s context of regulatory pluralism, a conflict-free certification 
scheme can only be implemented if it operates according to the prin-
ciples of débrouillardise.
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Interim conclusion
The above said indicates that a purely economic 
reading falls short of capturing all elements neces-
sary for a comprehensive conflict analysis of eastern 
DRc to identify lasting solutions. Whilst the recogni-
tion of economic factors and mechanisms has 
brought important international attention to the on-
going conflicts in the DRc, the oversimplified explan-
ation that all fighting in the DRc is motivated by 
wanting to secure access to resources (and is fin-
anced through the trade in resources) has obstructed 
a closer look at and a better understanding of the ac-
tual causes of conflict.
instead of taking the proliferation of armed 
groups and the militarised mineral trade as the main 
reasons for misery and conflicts, they have to be seen 
as symptoms of an enduring state failure (Doeven-
speck et al., 2013, p. 289; Seay, 2012, p. 17)—a failure to 
provide security and basic necessities for the people 
living in the congo.
Box 2  
Collaboration of official and non-official actors in  
governing an artisanal mining site in South Kivu*
In alluvial artisanal gold mining, groups of workers manually wash 
gold out of river sands. The visited mining sites in Mukera, Fizi Territory, 
South Kivu are situated outside the village, in government-controlled 
territory. In 2011, various regulatory authorities were present: the 
mining authority, a local chef de police, the village chief, the Congolese 
secret service (ANR), and military units. Both the mining authority 
and the village chief physically checked on the mining sites to control 
miners’ registration cards and collect fees that go beyond what is fore-
seen by law. Sometimes they were accompanied by a local policeman 
who could lock up those who did not have valid papers or who were not 
prepared to pay a bribe. Customary and civil state authorities thus ac-
tively co-governed the mining site and collaborated closely. The mili-
tary units stationed in Mukera were not directly positioned at the 
mining sites, but were reported to occasionally erect barriers at the 
entry points of the mining sites and to force miners to pay random 
amounts of “duties”. In addition, the mining division reportedly collected 
fees on behalf of the military. 
The mining authority used forms of miners’ self-organisation for gov-
erning the mining site. Pit managers and diggers were organised in 
so-called cells. The cell chiefs were responsible for co-ordinating the 
collection of levies by the mining authority. The mining authority also 
collaborated with unofficial regulatory powers—the village chief and 
his entourage—in the distribution of land for mining. When gold was 
found on land around the village, the land would be divided into three 
zones: one would belong to the original land owner, one to the lucky 
finder of the gold and the third to the authorities. A mining officer 
based in a town nearby pointed out that officially a prospection permit 
is necessary, yet, “because we do not have the documents, we leave 
them free access.” By distributing land in an informal way, the local 
mining authority had seized control of land titling. It thereby provided 
the extraction practices with a semblance of legality. State agents col-
laborated with unofficial regulators—customary and military—to col-
lect levies they would otherwise not have access to (cf. iTSCi, Channel 
Research and Pact, 2013; IPIS, 2014, p. 17).
*All information is based on interviews by Marie Müller-Koné with 
miners, customary authorities, police, and state mining authorities in 
Fizi Territory, South Kivu, September to October 2011. 
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between the deadline for the implementation of 
the DFA (1 April 2011) and the launch of tracing and 
tagging initiatives in South Kivu and Maniema 
(November and December 2012), there was no legal 
market for untagged minerals in the Kivus and 
Maniema (cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 30; UN Group of Ex-
perts, 2012, p. 40). by August 2012, official exports of tin, 
tantalum and tungsten (3T) from these three regions 
had almost completely ceased (UN Group of Experts, 
2012, p. 40). This also included exports from conflict-
free mining sites (Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, pp. 23–
27/36). in consequence, many artisanal miners were 
forced to sell their minerals at very low prices to re-
finers and smelters who were not obliged to prove the 
(conflict-free) origin of their minerals. Prices for tan-
talum and tungsten in eastern DRc in consequence 
fell by 20 per cent, those for tin between 60 and 75 per 
cent (UN Group of Experts, 2012, pp. 52–53)—despite 
increasing world market prices.
Increase in smuggling
in response to the low prices offered, many arti-
sanal miners turned away from the 3T trade to the 
gold sector. This sector is much more militarised, 
with armed actors involved in various ways. Today, 
four out of five artisanal miners in the eastern DRc 
work in the gold sector (iPiS, 2014, p. 11–12). Gold, due 
to the small volume/high value ratio, is much harder 
to regulate and much easier to smuggle. it is estim-
ated that today almost 98 per cent of DRc’S artisan-
ally produced gold is smuggled out of the country to 
burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and South Sudan (iPiS, 
2014, p. 12). 
At the same time, the smuggling of 3T increased 
over the last years. A key incentive are the better 
prices  offered in Rwanda where all minerals are cer-
tified. During 2012 and 2013, the export volume of 
tungsten and tantalum from Rwanda increased—
mostly due to (illegal) imports of congolese minerals 
(UN Group of Experts, 2014, p. 42, 2015, p. 38; Manhart & 
Schleicher, 2013, pp. 30–31).
The above reality check of the regulation dis-
course suggests that technical interventions that fol-
low this rationale will not suffice to address eastern 
DRc’S problems. The following examination of the 
consequences of two such policy measures confirms 
this: the US legislation on conflict minerals from the 
DRc, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), and the mining ban 
that congolese President Joseph Kabila introduced in 
September 2010. it is very difficult to analyse the im-
pacts of Section 1502 of the DFA detached from the 
presidential ban. The ban prohibited all extraction 
and export of gold, tin and tantalum in North and 
South Kivu and Maniema provinces. it was in force 
until March 2011.
The ban, if not a direct consequence of the DFA, 
has been at least strongly influenced by it. Many 
scholars argue that the DFA reinforced the tenden-
cies triggered by the presidential ban as companies 
were disincentivised from buying congolese miner-
als. This led to a de facto embargo (Matthysen & Zar-
agoza, 2013, p. 8; cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 2). The follow-
ing section elaborates on the consequences of the de 
facto embargo on the mining sector, the security situ-
ation, the living conditions and the financing of 
armed groups.
Collapse of the mining sector
Despite its faulty implementation10, the mining 
ban had a “paralyzing effect” (cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 2) 
on the mining sector and led to a significant reduc-
tion in mineral production to 20 per cent of the ini-
tial production volume (Parker & Vadheim, 2013, p. 12; 
Geenen, 2012, p. 327). Most international companies 
did not return to the DRc after the presidential ban 
was lifted in March 2011 because they were under 
pressure to state the origin of their minerals as re-
quired by the DFA (Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 3). 
This concerns most notably the Malaysia Smelting 
corporation, which had purchased up to 80 per cent 
of eastern congolese tin before it pulled out in 2010 
(cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 21). 
10 \  Many mining sites, such as bisie (North Kivu), actually expanded 
during the presidential ban (Mattysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 36). 
Consequences of putting the regulation discourse 
into practice
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Deterioration of the security situation
Faced with few economic opportunities outside of 
the mining sector, many unemployed young men, es-
pecially in remote regions not targeted by certification 
initiatives, joined armed groups (Matthysen & Zaragoza, 
2013, p. 42; charbonnier & Atanasijevic, 2014a, Vogel, 
2014). coinciding with the downturn in the local econ-
omy, the years between 2010 and 2013 saw a prolifera-
tion of armed actors, especially Mai Mai militias such 
as Raia Mutomboki, and their activities (Johnson, 2013, 
pp. 8–9; Vogel, 2014; Oxfam, 2012, p. 7). This increase has 
certainly been influenced by a number of factors, two 
of them being fewer opportunities to make a living 
out of mining and the threat by the M23 movement.
Since the defeat of the M23 movement in Novem-
ber 2013, the activities of armed groups have signific-
antly decreased, and a relatively large number of 
rebels have surrendered (iPiS, 2014, p. 7). This decrease, 
however, seems more linked to joint congolese army/ 
MONUScO military operations and local dynamics 
than to developments in the mining sector (Vogel, per-
sonal communication, 2014). in addition, as some mili-
tias moved from the Kivus to Katanga in 2013, the lat-
ter suffered increasingly under spreading violence and 
insecurity (Johnson, 2013, p. 8). Mai Mai militias con-
tinue to have a destabilising effect on the north of 
Katanga until today (Ökumenisches Netz Zentralafrika, 
2014, p. 3). Moreover, criminality has risen significantly, 
adding to the overall increased insecurity (cuvelier et 
al., 2013, p. 10; Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 26). Even 
where there is no active fighting, the day-to-day acts 
of looting present a constant threat to civilians (Laudati, 
2013, pp. 38–39). 
Financing of armed groups
The financial power of armed groups has been 
hardly affected by lower prices and decreased reve-
nues from the 3T trade. Most of them have diversi-
fied or shifted their income sources, focussing in-
creasingly on taxation of other goods, extortion, and 
the legal and illegal commerce of marijuana, palm 
oil, salt, sugar and other consumables (Laudati, 2013; 
Vogel, personal communication, 2014). Within the 
mining sector, gold has become increasingly 
important for artisanal miners and armed groups 
alike. As gold is exported almost entirely unrecorded, 
its trade offers a lot of opportunities to armed 
groups (iPiS, 2014, pp. 11–12). in sum, contrary to the 
proclaimed goal, the congolese mining ban and the 
de facto embargo did not cut down the income 
sources of armed groups. Furthermore, it allowed 
the congolese army and police to consolidate and 
even foster their involvement in the mining sector, 
such as in the mining site bisie (Matthysen & Zar-
agoza, 2013, p. 15; cuvelier et al., 2014, p. 2).
worsening of living conditions
in contrast to the armed groups, the mining ban 
and the de facto embargo had a strong impact on the 
civilian population. in the wake of decreasing prices 
and revenue flows, poverty and unemployment in-
creased, businesses closed and school drop-out rates 
rose up to 50 per cent in some areas (cuvelier et al., 
2014, pp. 10, 26; Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, pp. 35–36; 
UN Group of Experts, 2012, pp. 53–54). Low prices also 
had an adverse impact on working conditions in the 
mines as workers had no means to buy boots, torches 
or gas (UN Group of Experts, 2012 p. 52). in sum, living 
standards in eastern DRc deteriorated sharply.
Modest improvements through  
certification efforts
During 2013, the production and trade of tin and, 
to a much smaller degree, of tungsten and tantalum 
was revived in the Kivus and Maniema (UN Group of 
Experts 2013, p. 36, 2014a, p. 42; Matthysen & Zaragoza, 
2013, p. 36). This increase in tin production in South 
Kivu and Maniema coincided with the implementa-
tion of certification initiatives, such as the conflict- 
Free Tin initiative in South Kivu (Kalimbi) in Novem-
ber and in Maniema (Kalima and Kailo) in December 
2012. in these areas, prices for minerals rose, and  
the economic situation of the population improved 
(Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 41). 
However, due to insecurity and dysfunctional 
state structures, progress in certifying minerals is 
very slow and will remain so. There is hardly any 
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infrastructure to trace the trading of artisanally 
mined minerals. by October 2014 only an estimated 
five to six per cent of all mining sites in eastern DRc 
had been accessed to check their conflict status. Only 
86 out of more than 1,000 registered sites were con-
sidered conflict-free by that time (EurAc, 2014, p. 12). 
in consequence, the great majority of miners work 
“in a sphere of illegality” (cuvelier et al., 2014, pp. 14–15) 
regardless of the presence of armed actors at their 
mining site.
A few trading centres were built in North Kivu 
(Rubaya) and South Kivu (Mugogo and baraka) that 
were supposed to offer a safe place to market miner-
als at fairer prices. Yet this is clearly insufficient for 
the whole of the Kivus. Still, the hope that the min-
eral trade would soon pick up led to an increase in 
production there (Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 11). 
These affirmative developments have been limited  
to 3T mines in areas that are watched more closely 
by international companies, mining authorities  
and civil society (UN Group of Experts, 2012, p. 54;  
Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, pp. 41–42). 
in more remote areas, such as Walikale (North 
Kivu) and Lubutu (Maniema), the population had to 
bear the consequences of the presidential ban, but so 
far has not benefitted from initiatives to revive the 
trade (Matthysen & Zaragoza, 2013, p. 42).
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suppressing the trade in minerals without creating 
sustainable income opportunities will first and fore-
most harm civilians and will not have a decisive im-
pact on armed actors. Moreover, excluding armed ac-
tors from mining sites will not alter the quality of 
political structures. Armed actors—if determined to 
fight—will revert to alternative sources of income.
To change that determination, underlying factors 
that maintain conflict need to be addressed. To that 
effect, measures dealing with the local conflicts are 
needed, especially with those over land, and mea-
sures that diversify economic opportunities beyond 
mining that promote inter-community reconciliation 
and that address the dysfunctional and predatory 
state structures. All parties to the conflicts—including 
government actors—need not only be held account-
able for their actions but also be involved to find sus-
tainable solutions. A political process about pressing 
issues needs to be started and followed through. 
First steps in the right direction have been made. 
A comprehensive process on land reform has been 
started but still awaits further implementation. The 
parliamentary inquiry into the fate of mining reve-
nues in South Kivu (iPiS, 2014) is another positive de-
velopment. initiatives like these need to receive 
powerful external backing and support.if the (legally 
and illegally acquired) revenues from the mineral 
sector were accounted for, they could be invested to 
improve the living conditions of people who pay the 
levies.  
EU legislators should therefore bear in mind that 
they are currently dealing with symptoms of the 
armed conflicts in the DRc. To address the causes, 
conflict-minerals legislation needs to be embedded 
in coherent peace policies. Policies aimed at curbing 
conflict-financing should be weighed against the pri-
ority to satisfy basic needs of the population concerned. 
in summary, the combined consequences of the 
DFA and the presidential ban on the economic situ-
ation in eastern congo were desastrous and coun-
ter-productive to what had been intended: First, the 
local economy as well as civilians’ livelihoods were 
severely affected and are still to recover. Second, the 
effect on the financial power of armed actors has 
been very limited. Moreover, and third, by depriving 
thousands of artisanal miners of their most import-
ant income source, both regulatory actions may have 
indirectly contributed to an increase in armed groups 
and their activities between 2010 and 2013, and to a 
rise in criminality.
conflict-free certification initiatives, in contrast, 
have had more positive effects. These initiatives ac-
knowledge the importance of the mineral sector for 
the local population and thus seek to stimulate the 
legal mineral trade. conflict-free certification has led 
to a modestly improved economic situation of the 
population in the areas where they have been imple-
mented. The DFA provided a crucial impetus to getting 
these initiatives off the ground. While their effect on 
the security situation is less clear, they at least seem 
not to have had an adverse effect. Their prospects for 
success remain limited due to the following obstacles:
   \ under the current laws, artisanal miners can 
hardly meet the criteria for legality and depend 
on the state to provide the conditions for legal-
ity (artisanal mining zones);
   \ various power holders—from military com-
manders, armed groups’ leaders, to customary 
authorities and state institutions—gain from 
the practices of informal mining through taxa-
tion (i.e. the débrouillardise mode of governing). 
Our analysis explains why technical and econ-
omic solutions, such as efforts to regulate the min-
eral trade, alone will and cannot end conflicts. Most 
armed actors—contrary to many civilians—are 
neither solely dependent on nor solely motivated by 
profits from the mineral trade. Any attempts of 
Reflexion
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